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ABSTRACT
New Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory have given rise to a group of
problems which lie on the frontier between Economic Theory and Ethics. The
attempts to deal with these problems have generated a literature known as «on Ethics
and Economics». The analytical developments of concepts like utility, preferences or
well-being and notions like meta-preferences, agency or commitment (Sen) all con-
nect directly to the ethical dimension that any Theory of Value presupposes. In rela-
tion with the Theory of Choice, concepts like rationality, consistent election and self-
interest impede the accommodation of behaviors like altruism or others whose
consequences do not affect directly to the acting agent. The perceived difficulty to
link ethical aspects of actions with standard Economic Theory allows us to qualify
the relationship between Economics and Ethics as one of mere juxtaposition.
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Preferences, Rationality, Consistency.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Because of the historical development of New Welfare Economics (NWE),
firstly, and of Social Choice Theory (SCT) secondly, a group of problems has arisen,
and the attempts to solve them have resulted in a set of theoretical results on the fron-
tier between Economic Theory and Ethics. In this set it is necessary to distinguish, on
the one hand, between a Theory of Value that deals with the identification and analy-
sis of the hierarchical ordering of ends —individual or collective ends—; and, on the
other hand, a Theory of Choice that analyzes the methods to achieve efficiently the
proposed ends in individual or collective environments.
Within the Theory of Value, impossibility theorems, paradoxes and anomalies
commonly analyzed in the literature seem to show the limits of the analytic develop-
ment of the classical concepts of utility, preferences or well-being. The attempts to
overcome these limits, by means of notions like meta-preferences, agency or com-
mitment (Sen), connect directly to the ethical dimension that any Theory of Value
presupposes. Moreover, in the Theory of Choice, the identification of rationality, con-
sistent choice and self-interest impedes a correct understanding of behaviors like
altruism or others whose consequences do not directly affect the particular agent. The
perceived difficulty to link the ethical aspects of human action with some standard
Economic Theory issues, might allow us to qualify the relationship between Econo-
mics and Ethics as one of mere juxtaposition.
The main objective of this work is to show the analytical foundations that point
out this relationship, specifically in a Social Choice and Welfare Economics context.
This paper does not pursue to establish the link for the integration of Ethics and Eco-
nomics —a rather difficult task— but to especify some of the main elements in the
explaination of the prevalent link between Ethics and Economics in the literature. It
is a critical survey on the state in which Ethics and Economics are related (by juxta-
position) in standard Economic Theory and on the main analytical consequences
implied by this type of relation.
This paper explores these questions as follows. Section 2 presents the antecedents
of the debate «on Ethics and Economics» from the perspective of standard Economic
Theory. Section 3, points out the main problems appearing within the relevant deba-
te by pointing out some theoretical attempts to link «ethics and economics». Section
4 poses the thesis, which we have denominated the relation of «juxtaposition betwe-
en ethics and economics». Finally, the paper offers a brief conclusion.
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2. THE TOPIC «ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS»
The antecedents of the theoretical connection between Ethics and Economics go
back, at least, to Aristotle who conceived Economics as a part of practical Philosophy
together with Politics and Ethics. At the beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aris-
totle places Economics in relation to human ends by referring to the specific purpo-
se of Economics as a set of methods or skills oriented to the objective of increasing
wealth (crematistic). On the contrary, Politics is considered to be the main art that one
should use «for the rest of the sciences», including Economics, since Politics settles
down what should and should not be done to reach the final objective of Politics, that
is, the good for human happiness (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I).
From this tradition of thought, beginning with the Greek philosophers and conti-
nuing right up to the present, an entire history of diffusion of ideas has developed.
Chafuen (1991) expresses the dissemination of these ideas in the western world by
means of a genealogical tree in which «late scholastic Economics» is at the root (Cha-
fuen 1991, p. 33). It is broadly accepted (Beltrán ,1993, p. 38-44, chapter IV of Roth-
bard 1999, and Grice-Hutchinson, 1978) that the Hispanic Scholastic allowed the dif-
fusion to work, thereby allowing us to identify the background from which the work
of Adam Smith was born in 1776.
Notwithstanding these origins, Economics did not continue to wear the coat of
Philosophy, in particular, of Moral Philosophy, but rather it was operating a division
toward its autonomy as a scientific discipline. The discipline ceased to be Political
Economy and became Economic Science. It was towards the end of the nineteenth
century when we find the idea that the decisions of economic agents, and not the
investigation on the nature and causes of wealth should be the central objective of this
«new» science. This fact coincides with the widespread acceptance of a new Theory
of Value (the subjective Theory of Value) that places the concept of utility as the keys-
tone of the entire economic analysis, thus implying a redefinition and reorientation of
the discipline.
At this foundational epoch of the new economic science, the so-called Margina-
list Revolution, a new division takes place; a rupture that leads to the identification of
at least two clearly different traditions. Firstly, the tradition that gave origin to the
Neoclassical paradigm (headed by Walras and Jevons) which accentuates the scienti-
fic character of Economics by adopting the canon of Physics —in particular, rational
mechanics— at the price of radically separating the economic science from the
Ethics. In this tradition, Robbins (1938) points out the impossibility of relating Eco-
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nomics and Ethics, outside of mere juxtaposition. The second tradition, also within
marginalism, it is inaugurated by Menger and continued by his Austrian disciples.
This tradition insists on human action and its enterprenurial development as the ker-
nel of Economics (Hayek, 1935). This tradition does not assume Physics as a scien-
tific canon, nor does it take Mathematics as the language of the social sciences.
Of these two traditions, the first one has been preponderant to the point to which
modern Economics is often identified with Neoclassical Marginalism. It is within this
context, where, traditionally, the concern and subsequent reflection on the relations-
hip between Ethics and Economics has arisen. In particular, it is worth mentioning
the schools of thought that, in a first stage, can be recognized as Welfare Economics
and from which derives, at a later stage, New Welfare Economics (Bergson, 1938,
1954; Hicks, 1939; Samuelson 1947, 1948; Scitovsky, 1941, 1942) and Social Choi-
ce Theory (Arrow, 1950, 1951). These schools were born as a consequence of the
problems of social election that emerge in the western societies in which Public Sec-
tor increases its weight giving origin to important questions of justice, equity and
redistribution.
The so-called Welfare Economics arises from the possibility of transferring
resources among agents for the sake of greater equity without affecting efficiency,
according to the second Theorem of Welfare Economics. The traditional notions of
Welfare Economics are based on the approach of Pareto, on compensatory approa-
ches, and on Social Welfare Functions: these approaches consider «aggregate» prefe-
rences over the distribution of utility among the different individuals of a collective.
Under this conception, the Public Sector turns out to be a benevolent agent whose
performances should contribute to increasing general well-being. The discussion of
the agents’ goals is the discussion on which function of well-being should be chosen
in order to carry out the pertinent distribution. The ruler’s preferences in connection
with the desired distribution of resources is summarised in a Social Welfare Function,
according to the position of Bergson and Samuelson (similar to an individual’s utility
function but referred to the aggregate). It is a means of establishing specific «deci-
sions on ends» without concern to either who actually establishes them or how the
ordination of preferences that such a Social Welfare Function implies is reached.
The explicit consideration of the mechanisms of aggregation of individual prefe-
rences carried out by Arrow (Social Choice Theory), as well as of the collective deci-
sion-making processes in a typical democratic system (Public Choice Theory), cau-
sed the crisis of Wellfare Economics. Consequently, the sense of the theory is
reoriented from an ingenuous normative plane when considering the performances of
the Public Sector, to another more realistic one that analyzes how such collective
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1 See Arrow (1959); Little (1949, 1952, 1957); Sen (1964, 1966, 1969) and especially Sen
(1970); Sen & Pattanaik (1969); Tullock (1946, 1964, 1967); Uzawa (1959); Pattanaik (1971);
Plott (1976); Pollak (1979).
2 General critical visions are Buchanan (1954, 1964) and Sugden (1981, 1985, 1986).
Some critical publications «from inside of» of STC are: Sen (1970), considered to be the inflec-
tion point in thought; Sen (1976, 1977, 1983, 1985, 1992, 1993); Harsanyi (1955, 1976, 1982)
and Suzumura (1978, 1980).
decisions are in fact adopted. Indeed, when thinking about the possibility of taking
collective decisions starting from individual preferences with some desirable proper-
ties, Arrow obtains his Impossibility Theorem, and ends up questioning the viability
of the New Welfare Economics and opening the way to the Social Choice Theory.
The theoretical development of the Social Choice Theory can be summarized as
follows: (a) it begins with the study of choice criteria and the outcomes reached under
different rules of collective choice (extension of Social Choice Theory —years 60-75
approximately1. (b) It continues with a critical vision and the searching for solutions
to the problems outlined by social choice (critical period —years 75-85)2. (c) It ends
with the generalization of the debate «on Ethics and Economics» because of the open
discussion concerning the problems of the theory of social choice (division of the pre-
vious research program, from the decade of the 80s onwards).
Here we can verify what we believe constitutes a paradox: the necessity of con-
siderations of an ethical kind is imposed, but from that tradition of Economic Theory
whose antecedents had been focused on allocative aspects of human behavior. Inde-
ed, the conventional literature «on Ethics and Economics» is developed mainly by
authors that start from a concern for the technical aspects of the allocative processes
such as social development of compensatory approaches, rules of collective choice,
and relative theorems of impossibility.
These authors finish at wondering about the sense of an Economic Theory that
does not examine the content and hierarchy of the ends of the individuals. An exce-
llent exponent of this analytical process is Sen.
As it has been shown, to proceed in this manner is coherent with a program that
arises as one of the branches of Neoclassical Economics in its most modern version,
that is, Social Choice Theory. The concern arises where this theory is not able to
explain de facto situations. Thus, the attempt to solve a particular group of problems
has focused attention on the relationship between the economic «be» and the ethical
«should be».
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3 Sen (1987, p. 10) relates them beginning with the Socratic question of how it is neces-
sary to live. Griffin (1993) outlines it along similar lines.
4 It is necessary to point out, also, the existence of an entire parallel literature applied to
ethics in business. This literature is outside the scope of the present paper.
In the context of Social Choice and of the welfare theory, Ethics and Economic
Theory have to do with arguments posed in terms of questions on the «good» and its
achievement3. The fundamental elements of both, that would relate, them, are, res-
pectively, a Theory of Value and a Theory of Choice. The Theory of Value would have
in its kernel the identification of what is «good», while the Theory of Choice would
determine the way in which that «good» can be achieved «in its higher degree», that
is, the choice of the correct way to arrive at the best end by means of the involvement
of specific types of actions and/or institutions.
Standard Economic Theory provides, on the one hand, a way of ordering prefe-
rences and satisfying them (properties of good ordering of the ends); and on the other
hand, it provides a theory —known as rational choice— that would characterize the
agent’s action (properties of good ordering in the means or instrumental rationality).
Thus, one would have a framework for valuation as well as a way of achieving what
is valued, respectively.
Some elements of the debate on Ethics and Economics would deal with the way
in which personal interests and preferences together with rational choice, are capable
of laying the foundations for the moral action, understood as the action that points out
the good end, individually or socially considered (Sen 1993, p.4).
Typical problems located on the frontier between Economic Theory and Ethics
are, for example, the following: (a) the relationship between preferences, utility and
well-being; (b) their relationship to the notion of the «good». (c) Interpersonal com-
parisons of value. (d) The meaning of economic rationality; (e) the identification of
economic rationality with «self interest»; (f) the relationship between economic
rationality and morality; (g) the unfolding of agency and well-being aspects. (h) The
justness-like aspect of the good and its effects on the choice of actions and institu-
tions and (i) the compatibility of well-being, freedom, rights and choice4.
Given this, we find a catalogue of examples of problematic questions that have to
do with the ends pursued by the agent, and that serves as a foundation for the deve-
lopment of the debate «on Ethics and Economics». In the following Section, we
expose the conventional problems concerning the Theory of Value and the Theory of
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Choice, as well as the attempts to overcome them by starting from those that it might
be denominated as integrative theories.
3. CONVENTIONAL PROBLEMS: THE DEBATE «ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS»
In order to present some of the main problems within the debate between Ethics
and Economics, we will organize the topics around two fundamental blocks that, as
it has already been stated, correspond to the basic intersecting areas between Ethics
and Economics. The first block concerns the question on how an individual values
(the Theory of Value). Once the valuation has been made, the second block concerns
the question of how he/she does choose (the Theory of Choice).
3.1. Problematic questions related with the Theory of Value
It is evident that before a choice can be made, a valuation is necessary. An indivi-
dual who seeks the «good» for him/herself, first values it as such, and then he/she cho-
oses it. Some of the concepts used by Economic Theory relating to the Theory of Value
are utility, preferences, meta-preferences, well-being, agency, achievement, and valua-
tion. The fundamental question now is if these concepts are capable of dealing with
the ethical considerations to what choices, eventually, an agent must face. To cope
with this fundamental question, firstly, we will consider the concept of utility and its
relationship with border concepts, together with a brief note about interpersonal com-
parability of utilities. Then, we will expose the most important attempt to transcend
the concept of personal utility, this is the so-called preferences over preferences.
3.1.1. Utility, preferences and well-being
The term utility is central in economic analysis and in the ethical tradition of the
utilitarianism from which it arises. In addition, it is the key concept to understanding
the Theory of Value that comes from the Marginalist Revolution. In order to detail the
debate pointed out in this section around this term, two controversial questions have
emerged: (a) how utility is related to other key concepts that reflect the agent’s sub-
jectivity; and (b), the type of moral principles implied by utilitarianism.
The controversial question (a) is complex due to the difficulties derived from the
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5 Criticism outlined by Sen (1987, p. 39).
6 On functional of social welfare see Sen (1979), Hammond (1976), and Arrow (1977).
fact that, oftenly, different authors use the same word to express different realities. It
seems accepted that utility constitutes the origin of value while preferences are the
base of rational choice. In this way, two of the fundamental areas of modern econo-
mic analysis are thus connected. However, a series of problematic aspects arise from
this distinction:
1. We can find understandings of preferences as mental satisfaction (Marshall,
1890; Pigou, 1920, 1952), desires (Ramsey, 1931; Hicks, 1939), choices
(Samuelson, 1947; Harsanyi, 1955), values (Arrow, 1951), and so there are
interpretive variations depending on the specific context of the analysis.
2. Moreover, the notion of utility is confused with that of preferences, leading to
terms like «satisfaction», «desire» or «election». «Utility» embraces anything
that the agents want to value.
3. As a third element, the term «welfare» appears, and this is based on utility, but
its clear definition is very difficult, given the two previous problems. Thus, a
state can be judged as good if it is possible to specify a function for the utility
of that state that allows one to examine —via sum-ranking5 of the utilities in
that state— if this particular state is better or worse than another.
4. Given these previous points, it turns out that an individual values an achieve-
ment in terms of its consequences. That is, a choice of an action, an institu-
tion, or a norm, is conditioned by the goodness of the emerging social state,
calculated in terms of the welfare based on utility.
Thus, individual utility constitutes the «ethical» evaluation of the states; this is
the moral principle implied by utilitarianism (aspect (b) above).
Some arguments allow us to understand the above (a) and (b) questions. In the
first place, to locate preferences as the basis of choice has been one of the ways of
preserving the foundation of the New Welfare Economics. A theory would have very
little to say concerning the evaluation of social states if, in that evaluation, the prefe-
rences of the individuals are not somehow contemplated. This is the reason why, from
the initial stages of the New Welfare Economics tradition, the individual’s preferen-
ces are left out. Now then, an answer was soon found and, beginning with Arrow,
impossibility theorems that seek to show the inadequacy of such a basis for collecti-
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ve decision-making have been formulated. In this way, an alternative manner of tac-
kling decision problems based on social choice functions that ignore the problems of
Arrow’s impossibility theorem has emerged6.
In this process, there has been a change in foundation, not necessarily explicit,
but of radical importance. That is, many economists work with a new concept of uti-
lity (soon extended in the discipline) that could be denominated «lax utility» whose
main purpose is to serve as a convenient form of reference for welfare in a wide sen-
se, without the derived conceptual restrictions of tinged meanings. Firstly, preferen-
ces were introduced as the foundation of the choice that gives rise to the NWE.
Then, utility and preferences are merged together conceptually to facilitate the
advancement of the program of welfare economics —a very clear specification of the
different categories would interfere with the very expansion of the results—. Lastly,
lax utility is linked with welfare to create the welfare functionals and to extend SCT,
eliminating the problems that have arisen in welfare economics.
As a result, from a group of developments that were largely axiomatic and desig-
ned to bolster SCT, the conceptual foundation that sustained the framework of the
earliest welfarism (dedicated to delimit clearly and specifically such central concepts
as utility, preferences and well-being) was placed in the backgound, while the use of
the generic concept denominated by us as lax utility was expanded. This process
would explain the controversial questions mentioned above related to the key concept
of utility.
3.1.2. Interpersonal comparisons of utility
After the extension of the focus of ordinal utility, in the first third of the twentieth
century, questions that had to do with the possibility of measuring and comparing the
utility characteristic of the cardinal focus entered into disuse. The idea that interper-
sonal comparisons of utility implied a normative judgement (Robbins, 1938) was
extended, and the use of Paretian optimality was imposed as the only source of com-
parison over states, as this was identified with economic efficiency in the valuation
of social achievements. The possibility of measuring utility, or its conmensurability,
was eliminated together with its interpersonal comparability (Scitovsky, 1951). The
foundations of the NWE had been set.
However, in order to explore controversial issues, it is convenient to distinguish
carefully between commensurability and comparability. If utility is identified with
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7 Revisited, however, recently. See Roth (1999).
happiness, its measurement makes no sense. Now then, if utility is to be understood
as the representation of the underlying preferences, then when one chooses one alter-
native over another, a preference is revealed by the alternative that is chosen; that is
to say, the associated utility is larger in that case, which implies that you can measu-
re the agent’s utility as an index. Some economists maintain that, although utility can
be measured in this sense, this does not mean that interpersonal comparisons are pos-
sible by using these measures. Others, however, had argued that the rejection of such
comparisons is not due so much to the concept of utility upon which it rests, but
rather to the fact that we could have several types of methods for the comparison that
do not necessarily yield the same results (Sen, 1980; Hammond, 1991). In the opi-
nion of Sen (1970b), Arrow’s impossibility theorem would have shown the contra-
diction caused by the exclusion of the use of the individual comparisons to achieve a
consistent and complete social election that was capable of satisfying some see-
mingly weak conditions of rationality. In this sense, Sen offered an example of how
simple cardinality without comparability cannot be useful to obviate the impossibi-
lity of Arrow (on a functional of social welfare). We have highlighted this example
because it allows us to justify the importance of this polemic issue for interpersonal
comparisons: the theoretical formulation of the NWE rejected interpersonal compa-
risons; and the reflection on the same questions gave rise to the SCT. Thus, a pole-
mic issue opened a new line of research.
The fact that the questions of commensurability and comparability share a com-
mon ground over the meaning of utility has taken root in the welfare vision that links
utility with revealed preference, and it has relegated those issues7 relative to others of
more fundamental type, such as those that we will analyze in what follows.
3.1.3. Preferences over preferences, 
or a movement towards the subject’s motivation
One of the questions that have arisen because of the reflection on the foundations
of the theory has to do with the type of agent’s characterization assumed by the theory.
This characterization opened an important attempt to transcend the concept of perso-
nal utility. In this approach, the individual’s only source of value is utility, which has
been fully identified with his preferences, whose maximization determines individual
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Barbolla and Sanz (1995).
9 Notice that the economic factor is an agent «that chooses». Neoclasical Economic The-
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characteristics. In this way, the agent that does not come to a decision or that suffers a conflict
would be outside of the analysis.
welfare. Now, since preferences cannot be observed directly, but rather are revealed
by the choices made, it has been traditional to assume that they possess a certain
hypothetical structure, with the objective of working with a certain degree of security
in the development of results or microeconomic theorems8. These hypotheses gene-
rally have made correspond certain «observed behavior» by the theorist to a certain
internal structure of assumed preferences, thereby preparing the way for their axio-
matic treatment. It is what Sen denominated «internal correspondence» in choice
(Sen 1993).
However, there exist agent’s characteristics that indicate the necessity to incor-
porate a wider characterization of the subjectivity of preferences into the analysis.
Following the tradition of the literature, we can mention superior orders of preferen-
ces or meta-preferences that would serve as the door to introduce into the analysis
elements of higher dimension and difficulty; in particular, to present controversial
questions such as the freedom of choice or the freedom of saying no9. The fact that
these meta-preferences are present in the individual, allows us to enlarge its charac-
terizing features in several ways.
This amplification has been made in different ways in the literature depending on
the author. Among them, we can highlight what has become known as the agency
aspect of individual behaviour that would be linked with his/her freedom —even
before the mere aspect of welfare and its connection with achievements (Sen, 1985b,
1987). This amplification, proposed by Sen, corresponds to one of his first studies on
this topic. Other authors also show a concern for the preferences «further on» of the
standard (Jeffrey, 1974; Hirschman, 1985).
Sen (1992b) has enlarged the subject’s characterization incorporating «motiva-
tions» in a general way into his analysis. Sen claims that people sometimes act on a
sense of duty or commitment. The standard theory does not bear in mind this issue,
thus considering cases of choices that go «against the preferences». As an alternative
to preferences, he proposed an approach that focuses on capabilities. Within this
approach the individual’s welfare is a function of everything constituting his base abi-
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lities, among which are those that can be reached discrectionaly and those that can-
not, and others that independently of the individual’s will —and of the utility that is
associated to the alternatives—, he/she should possess (for example, literacy). Aside
from the capabilities, it also incorporates what is denominated functionings —aspects
that are characteristics of living —in this way, the state of being is considered to be
a vector of functionings. All such possible vectors of an individual constitute his/her
capability set, and represent the welfare opportunities open to him/her that would be
linked with his/her freedom. Thus, we could identify the individual’s ulterior goals,
and we can interpret those «anomalous» elections from the point of view of the con-
ventional theory as possible cases. The individuals’ commitments to each other would
have been incorporated as a part of the analysis, in such a way that the widest possi-
ble characterization of the agent’s welfare would have become specially interesting
by relating the multiplicity of categories of information about the person and his/her
motivations10.
3.2. Problematic questions relative to the Theory of Choice
The previous section has served to identify the questions wich are in the frontier
between ethics and economics concerning the source of an individual’s values.
We now face the following question, from this valuation: how does the individual
choose?
As a conventional rule of human behavior, Economic Theory proposes what is
known as rational choice; or the election of the best alternative among those possible
ones. However, in order to show some additional elements on the debate between
ethics and economics, let us consider the following questions: what does rationality
mean from a wider point of view that adds an ethical consideration to the problem?
and, how can we combine economic behavior based on the individual’s interest and
on ethical actions?
To cope with these questions, firstly, we will specify what meaning we can attach
to the term rationality as a base for economic choice, and what are the links that asso-
ciate it with other related terms, as well as to what extent can moral aspects be recog-
nized in economic topics. Secondly, we will address the issue of what connection
exists between rationality and consistency, since in this way we will be able to study
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 15
11 A lot of work on this conventional characteristic assumed by Economic Theory has been
done. The assumption has been criticized and there are several alternatives; see Sen (1973,
1974) and «Rational Fools: A Criticique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory»,
listed as Sen (1977b). The three mentioned articles have been republished in Sen (1982). See
also Hirschman (1985), Broome (1978, 1999) and Hirshleifer (1985).
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irrational choice. Lastly, and as a brief conclusion, we will consider how the moral
aspect of a choice is related to economic rationality in a problematic way, that is, the
moral aspect of economic rationality. All of these issues will permit us to offer the
principal lines that configure the debate mentioned above in relation to the Theory of
Choice.
3.2.1. Rationality, personal interest and self-interest vs. morality
The consideration of the way in which an agent chooses begins with the predic-
tion of real human behavior mediated by the assumption of rationality. In this way, it
is said, economists would have opted for the simplification of the assumptions of
ethical order, until only one remains: the identification of rationality with the maxi-
mization of one’s own interest11 —an interpretation of the homo economicus—
(Roth, 1999, Chp. 2). Rationality would thus be expressed as the search for self-inte-
rest; in such a way that the preferences revealed by agent’s choices (Theory of Value)
should indicate to us what that agent tries to achieve, under the assumption that the
observed choice is the best possible alternative for him/her (Theory of Choice).
The generalization of this assumption of self-interest is not based upon any evi-
dence; it is a hypothesis of human behavior that allows the formulation of behavioral
predictions. In this sense, Sen quoted a reflection of Stigler concerning the character
of this hypothesis and of its use in conventional economics: «Let me predict the out-
come of the systematic and comprehensive testing of behaviour in situations where
self-interest and ethical values with wide verbal allegiance are in conflict. Much of
the time, most of the time in fact, the self-interest theory (as I interpreted on Smithian
lines) will win»12.
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3.2.2. Rationality and axiomatic consistency
How can the idea of rationality be «operative» within economic analysis? As has
already been said above, by presupposing a certain analytically tractable correspon-
dence between what the individual chooses and the underlying preferences. In other
words, if preferences are internally consistent13, it can be affirmed that the agent is
rational. This practice implies the identication of rationality and consistency.
Several problematic issues arise at this point. Once some certain hypotheses of a
priori consistency of preferences are assumed, the analysis no longer requires choi-
ces to judge preferences —but rather it is the other way around—; we can begin with
the individual’s preferences and, from them, «predict» his/her choices. These choices
will be the best possible alternatives or, via the principle of rational behavior, those
that guarantee the maximum interest for the individual14.
Now then, when do analytical difficulties appear? It is evident that difficulties ari-
se when the notion of rationality is to be applied to an action that incorporates prefe-
rences or interests that, a priori, seem to be opposed to the individual’s own best inte-
rest. It is said in this case that the agent, when choosing a certain alternative, acts
irrationally or against his own interest. It would be a case outside the analysis sho-
wing an opposition between ethic and economic values.
In the deductive process —from preferences to choices— any choice that contra-
dicts or that it is not consequent with the hypotheses and axioms of consistency that
are assumed on preferences, would lie outside the analysis. For example, the indivi-
dual’s possible choices that have nothing to do with his individual self-interest
directly but rather with that of other people (altruism), or those other choices that are
explained by duty and that can even go against the agent’s interests. This would mean
that, according to conventional Economic Theory, the only way in which the requi-
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15 On the relationship between Smith’s work and the origin of the principle of self-interest
as a characterization of an agent in Economic Theory, the analysis in Sen (1987, pp. 21-28) is
specially critical in some passages. There, the author ends up affirming that it is the reduction
of what he denominates the wide human beings’ Smithian vision, that can be thought of as one
of the most important deficiencies in contemporary economic theory; he also mentiones that
this impoverishment is closely related to the distancing of Economics and Ethics.
16 See, for example, Roback (1995a and 1995b).
17 Harsanyi (1976) and Rawls (1971) are classic works in this line.
rement of self-interest is not fulfilled —that is, being irrational— is to be internally
inconsistent.
In short, the explanation offered by standard theory of the choices made by an
individual relies on a principle of egoism15 that, in the end, collapses those dimen-
sions of the behavior of the individual that relate antagonistic ethical motivations to
the principle of systematic self-interest16. Summing up, the combination of rationa-
lity and morality presents enough controversial characteristics: it becomes difficult to
coordinate the choice of the best alternative —in the sense of self-interest— and the
good moral end. For this reason, the attempt to explore both aspects has been one of
the recurrent topics in the literature that occupy us17.
3.2.3. Summary: Moral motivations and rationality
Given the above, the debate «on Ethics and Economics» seems to offer the coro-
llary that we succinctly point out: the self-interest focus of rationality prevailing
within economic analysis, assumes that the vision of human motivation based on
ethics could be outside. Thus, the real problem would be to know if it is a plurality
of motivations, or exclusively self-interest, that moves individuals. By assuming
merely self-interested behavior, as points out this literature, makes so little sense as
it presupposes that the individual always acts in a disinterested way. If a theory based
on the second type of assumption has not been yet formulated, why should we accept
a theory based exclusively on the first one? This seems to be enough reason to con-
tinue research on this issue.
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18 Some outstanding works are: Boulding (1973), Phelps (1975), Collard (1978) —consi-
dered to be a pioneer work for these topics— Becker (1976a, pp. 817-826) and Becker (1981,
cap. 8), Hirshleifer (1977, pp. 500-502) where the author comments on aspects of the focus of
Becker, Margolis (1982) and other outstanding publications in the survey, Zamagni (1995).
19 Some seminal publications on morality and advantage are: Gauthier (1967), Sen (1974,
1977c), Elster (1985), it Shines & Raiffa (1958), Rapoport & Chammah (1965) and Harsanyi
(1985). Using game theory to discuss technically different results on advantage, among many
references, we can cite Kreps et al. (1982), Rubinstein and Yaari (1983), Kreps and Wilson
(1982).
3.3. Towards the ‘links’: some theories
Once the problematic points have been exposed, it is necessary to point out some
attempts to link ethical and economic aspects. Among them, we find the following
specially prominent:
1. The economic theory of altruism and self-interest. This literature arises when
distinguishing between personal well-being and the concern —positive or
negative— for the well-being of other people. From this perspective, the stan-
dard economic notion of a rational agent conceived as a self-interest maximi-
zer is rejected. Within this literature, individual utility functions are usually
specified, with derivative arguments of consumption characteristics of the
agent and of other dependent arguments concerning the well-being of other
individuals18.
2. Morality and individual advantage. Another attempt consists of confronting
the individual achievement obtained from a rational action, with the mutual
advantage that would arise from moral behavior. This literature has developed
by starting from the reproduction of alternative situations, in the context of
specific and relevant dilemmas as those pointed out above; for example priso-
ner’s dilemma. Its objective is to prove if the strategic interactions among
agents can result in acting ways (for reasons of self interest) that we can
denominate «morally inferior»19.
3. The motivation approach. After a period of recent reflection, Sen faced a rese-
arch agenda which exposes a certain alternative focus to New Welfare Econo-
mics —and even to Social Choice Theory—, posing special emphasis on the
ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 19
20 Sen (1992). See also Sen (1981), Drèze and Sen (1989). In these publications, the author
considers the incompatibility of economic theory (of general equilibrium) with human neces-
sities and the persistence of hunger. It was a previous step for constructing a conceptual fra-
mework to introduce personal dimensions.
21 We have exposed the basic lines of this focus in previous sections.
22 For more details, see Encinar (2002) chapter III, and Encinar (2003).
person’s multidimensional character20. What is intended is to underline the
multiplicity of considerations that are involved in human motivation and that,
because of the informative restrictions of the Social Choice Theory, lay outsi-
de the analysis. For this reason, against the almost exclusive concern for well-
being and achievement, it turns out that the possibilities for action and free-
dom and the person’s rights become important. If, because of this, it turns out
that it can be difficult —or impossible— to determine a preference ordering,
this should not be understood as a limitation of the focus. More recently, Sen
emphasised the capabilities approach21 as the conceptual framework that
synthesizes the author’s critical position. Using this, Sen attempts to show
that, only by starting with a focus on capabilities it is possible to reflect on
ethical questions in Economics that do not fit within the conventional frame-
work22.
1. In one way or another, the motivation approach refers to the abilities that
organizations (and individuals) have to reach their goals. Indeed, the fact that
an organization wants to attain a certain goal does not mean that it has the
capacity to undertake the necessary actions to achieve it. In this context, evo-
lutionay theory points out the development of the concept of «dynamic capa-
bility» as a learned pattern of collective activity through which the organisa-
tion systematically generates and modifies its operational routines in pursuit
of improved effectiveness». (Zollo & Winter, 1999: 10). For Dosi et al. (2000:
2-4) «To be capable of some thing is to have a generally reliable capacity to
bring that thing about as a result of intended action». In this sense, capabili-
ties fill the gap between intention and outcome. That is, capabilities are rene-
wed and reshaped by the appearance of new intentions linked to new goals
(Cañibano, Encinar & Muñoz, 2005).
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The first attempt of linking ethic and economic dimensions try to extend the neo-
classical framework without abandoning it, by adding elements that are relevant for
recognize the presence of «ethical» aspects in the problem, based on the categories
of conventional economics. The third attemp has been pointed out as an illustration
of incorporation of elements qualitatively superior to the strict neoclassical frame-
work in the perspective of abandoning it, and with the objective that the resulting the-
ory be able to accommodate reflections concerning «Ethics and Economics».
4. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
The last question to be answered is to qualify the relationship between Ethics and
Economics in light of the above sections.
It is our thesis that the effective relationship between Ethics and Economics is
one of mere juxtaposition. We now go on to present the proof of this statement. This
test will be developed in three steps. Firstly, we will synthesize the problematic ques-
tions (step 1) at the frontier of both disciplines and that were discussed in section 3.
Next, we will show the analytic consequences that these problematic questions have
for the relationship between Ethics and Economics (step 2). The perceived difficulty
to link the ethical aspects of human action with some standard Economic Theory
issues, might allow to qualify the relationship between Economics and Ethics as one
of mere juxtaposition (step 3).
Step 1. In general, we can synthesize the central problematic points of the con-
ventional debate regarding the relationship Ethics and Economics as follows.
1. In the literature summarized in this paper, there are not a line of research that
allows us to discern with clarity what is exactly meant by fundamental con-
cepts as utility, preferences and welfare. In fact, a widespread use of the con-
cept of utility embraces almost everything that is valued: we refer to this as the
moral of utilitarianism.
2. The only valuable thing is the achievement, in consequence terms, of the indi-
vidual objectives of an action, so the final choice can be determined by the cal-
culation, a priori, of the goodness of the consequence in terms of individual
well-being. That is, it identifies what is good —and then chooses it— with
what reports positive achievements in terms of individual welfare, indepen-
dently of the value of the action itself: moral of achievement.
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3. The agent’s subjectivity is characterized by unknown preferences and by tho-
se particular characteristics assumed in order to make them especially tracta-
ble from a formal point of view.
4. An entire literature has raised concerning the lax meaning of utility (as a
representation of the underlying preferences), related to its commensurability
and/or comparability, but forgetting that the mere removal of the concept of
utility would have guided the discussion in other directions (nowadays, unex-
plored).
5. The principle of economic behavior or rationality is identified with maximum
self-interest, and as such the necessary incompatibility with many of the indi-
vidual’s real actions is verified.
6. For preferences to point out the best alternative for the individual (in the sen-
se indicated in 5 above), they should be internally consistent with his/her choi-
ces. Furthermore, the irrational (inconsistent) behavior can only be interpreted
as an analytic anomaly.
Step 2. The examination of points 1 to 6 gives rise to a series of consequences
that justify a research program under the epigraph of «on Ethics and Economics».
These consequences have been the object of debate and polemic over the last thirty
or forty years; its recurrence in the specialized economic literature would seem to be
indicative of a certain inertia in the polemic between Ethics and Economics. Let us
summarize by adding to the numeration an asterisk to indicate that we propose this
point as a main derivative consequence.
Analytic consequences for the ethics-economics relationship:
1*. From ‘moral of utilitarianism’. Extension of conceptual, wide and diffuse
uses, of terms related to subjectivity as if they were synonymous, with the
objective of not becoming overly committing to the widespread view of the
search for happiness as a good end for the individual. In this way, the indivi-
dual embarks upon a procedure of calculation, based on a concept of utility
that embraces almost everything that he/she may value.
2*. From ‘moral of achievement’. The calculation a priori of the goodness of the
consequence implies that strict consecuentialism may be the agent’s vital
norm.
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23 For more details, see Sen (1993).
3*. From ‘unknown preferences’. The assumptions on preferences necessarily
impose a series of conceptual and analytic restrictions that impede the recog-
nition in the analysis of what «goes further on», that is, the individual’s meta-
preferences. Also, the «choosing» determinism that this type of procedure
implies, leads to the appearance of real choices by the individual that seem
to go against the preferences: that is, «counter-preferential» choices.
4*. From ‘lax meaning of utility’. The debate on comparability —between the
old theoretical tradition of welfare and the new SCT—, based on the concept
of utility in a lax sense, has impeded the removal of the very concept of uti-
lity. It has rather led to discussions on such things as the ethical trials, non-
ethical issues, normative issues, etc., which are not very effective to fill the
conceptual gap.
5*. From ‘self-interest’. The self-interest as principle of rationality has extended
the casuistry of «the irrational» (altruistic actions, conflicts of interest, inde-
cision...) in the literature about Ethics and Economics, as a verification of the
fact that such actions are frequent.
6*. From ‘internal consistency’. Utility in a lax sense and the casuistry of «the
irrational» —4* and 5* above— imply that the mechanism of internal incon-
sistency of preferences when revealing an agent’s choices is the only way to
accommodate his/her «anomalous» choices analytically in an ad hoc fas-
hion23.
Step 3. An examination of the two previous steps (synthesis of conventional
problems and their analytic consequences) with the purpose of qualifying the rela-
tionship between ethical and economic aspects of the agent, allows us to point out
that only the utilitarianism and consequentialism ethics is compatible with the
representative agent modelled by the conventional Economic Theory. Thus, all
additional ethical considerations other than mere self-interest (e.g.: altruism, moti-
vations, etc.) often present in agent’s decision, will generate «irrational» choices or
«anomalies» that cannot be easily accommodated within the standard theoretical
framework. The developments presented in this paper and the validity of the deba-
te proves this point.
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Several ethical problems in the decisions of individuals that are not susceptible
—according to their characteristics— of being interpreted under the analytical prism
of utilitarianism or strictest consequentialism they continue «without explanation»
since they are outside of the domain of definition of the standard theory.
In this sense and from the point of view of the question that we have considered
in this section, we can qualify the relationship between Ethics and Economics as of
mere juxtaposition.
The debate «on Ethics and Economics» is the result of an analytic task consisting
on putting Ethics and Economics together. The aforementioned anomalies that emer-
ge from the conventional theory —that encourage, in turn, the very existence of the
debate and of the resulting literature— are useful to certify the presence of ethical
questions in processes of valuation and choice. However, this theory does not provi-
de a sufficiently coherent analytic base to link agent’s behavior based on non self-
interested motivations (that is the case, for example of Environmental Policy). A
coherent analytic base for establishing these links would avoid the use of internal
inconsistency of preferences as an interpretation of «anomalous» agent’s choices.
5. CONCLUSION
The reflection «on Ethics and Economics» is not new but recurrent in the econo-
mic discipline. However, it continues to be an open question what is the relationship
between the two terms. Since all choice processes assume an agent’s valuation, it
would seem natural to introduce a certain harmony among the values pursued by the
agent and his economic decisions. However taking as starting point the group of
observable choices, it is not possible, from conventional theory, to «re-construct» a
framework of valuations from the one in which the rational agent, in the economic
sense, articulates his/her choices.
In this way, two explanatory alternatives arise. Either it is a framework of tautolo-
gical valuation (all that is chosen is valued as the best alternative and the best alterna-
tive is the one that is indeed chosen) or it is a «generating» framework of anomalous
elections (e.g.: irrational or inconsistent from the point of view of conventional eco-
nomic rationality: altruism, philanthropy, etc.). Given this, we find a catalogue of seve-
ral problematic questions that have to do with the ends pursued by the agent, and that
serves as a foundation for the development of the debate «on Ethics and Economics».
The attempts to overcome these questions, by means of notions like meta-prefe-
rences, agency or commitment, connect directly to the ethical dimension that any
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Theory of Value presupposes. Moreover, in the Theory of Choice, the identification
of rationality, consistent choice and self-interest impedes a correct understanding of
behaviors like altruism or others whose consequences do not directly affect a parti-
cular agent.
The perceived difficulty to link the ethical aspects of human action with some
standard Economic Theory issues allows showing that the state of the current rela-
tionship between Ethics and Economics, in the context of the conventional debate, is
of mere juxtaposition.
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